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inculcating a sense of personal and social responsibility in young 
adults. The present emphasis on fiscal responsibility and budget 
reduction implies that any new expenditure program be funded by 
either: (a) reductions in present programs; or, (b) new taxes. As 
new taxes are regarded as "politically incorrect" by legislators 
seeking to extend their tenure, program cuts become mandatory. It 
is proposed that military downsizing is one means of funding 
national service; and that the tradeoff is suboptimal. Downsizing 
adversely affects minorities and the least skilled - who benefit 
most from military training. A new military enlistment option is 
suggested as a means of improving access for the least advantaged 
to the social mainstream and increasing the generation of human 
capital. The new option would be funded by reducing the maximum 
number of national service participants by 50%. 
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COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCIES: 
NATIONAL AND MILITARY SERVICE 
Introduction 
National service is an attempt by government to get young 
people involved in vital issues facing today's society. The 
federal government will hire people to teach the illiterate, help 
in police work, provide child care, and work on environmental 
cleanup. In return, volunteers will receive a minimum wage, 
educational/ training vouchers, and/or forgiveness of a portion of 
outstanding student loans. The mission of national service is a 
broad one. Its intent is to inculcate a sense of civic awareness 
and social responsiblity, thereby strengthening the social fabric 
while fostering marketable skills. As presently structured, 
national service contains philosophical elements of the Peace 
Corps, the Job corps, and Vista. 
While national service is being nurtured, the military 
services are being downsized. In an environment where any increase 
in the federal budget (increase in the deficit) must be accompanied 
by either a decrease in existing programs or an increase in taxes, 
it is not a logical contrivance to state that the two can be viewed 
as substitute public goods in a constrained budget. Efficiency 
dictates that scarce tax dollars be channeled between the programs 
in a manner which maximizes net social benefits. 
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The National service Program 
In the fall of 1993, the National Service and Community Trust 
Act was approved by Congress. The purpose of the law is, "to 
establish a Corporation for National Service, enhance opportunities 
for national service, and provide national service educational 
awards to persons participating in such service, and for other 
purposes." (Public Law 103-82, 103d Congress). Commencing in 1994 
with 25,000 participants and a budget of $400 million, the program 
is projected to grow to 100,000 young men and women and a budget of 
$3.4 billion by 1997. Participants in the program agree to spend 
one or two years in community-oriented service. In return, 
volunteers earn the minimum wage for the period of service 
(approximately $7,000 per year) and $5,000 to $10,000, depending on 
length of service, toward further education or repayment of 
outstanding student loans (Economist, March 6, 1993). 
National (non-military) service has its earliest tangible 
roots in the Civilian Conservation Corps, begun in 1933 to employ 
thousands of young men in conservation and fores try projects. John 
F. Kennedy instituted the Peace Corps in the early l960's to share 
American know-how with less developed nations and to allow American 
volunteers an understanding of the world beyond American shores. 
The Peace Corps was (and is) modest in scope, including, at its 
peak, no more·than 16,000 volunteers (Bernstein and Cock, 1993). 
President Clinton's national service corps represents the 
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largest effort at e�ploying young volunteers in the public welfare 
since the Great Depression. However, during the Depression the 
focus was more on incomes support and public works and less on the 
goal of fostering the spirit of community and, ultimately, 
nationhood. 
The most immediate antecedent of national service is embodied 
in the National Service and Community Act of 1990, which 
established pilot projects to test the viability of a national 
service initiative (Economist, June 13, 1992). The Corporation for 
National Service will provide umbrella supervision and parcel 
monies to similarly designed state commissions. In turn, state 
agencies would direct funds to community organizations providing 
local services - who might benefit from an influx of youthful 
volunteers. President Clinton views the national service plan as, 
"America at its best - building community, offering opportunity, 
and rewarding responsibility" (Economist, March 6, 1993). 
Plaws Inherent in National service 
Advocates of national service view the program as mit_igating 
a host of problems confronting today's youth: namely, the absense 
of training opportunities; the lack of community involvement; and, 
a shortfall in personal as well as civic responsibility. 
Proponents see the program as working where the market does not or' 
cannot; growing "non-market" attributes such as cohesiveness, 
social awareness, and equity. Furthermore, national service 
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addresses the problem of student loans (and their annual $2-$3 
billion in debtor defaults) by offering national service 
participants redress from part of debt obligations. Undoubtedly, 
the program is an omnibus of good intentions. 
However, the breadth of national service is also its flaw. 
National Service seeks to target a number of relatively diverse 
national ills with one program; becoming a social MIRV. More 
concretely, the costs of national service are not justified by its 
benefits. As in the Peace corps, the attractiveness of a "hitch" 
in national service is skewed toward the college-educated and 
college intended. The forgiveness of educational debt repayment 
makes the option particularly attractive to college-bound youth but 
much less so to its non-college oriented cohort. However, even if 
the initiative is fully embraced by young people, only 2% or less 
of the 14 million college students stand to benefit from the 
legislation's provisions '(Economist, March 6, 1993). 
costs of National service 
The costs of national service have been understated by its 
supporters. First, the program's advocates have noted that 
national service can be accomplished without adding a level of 
bureacracy. It is difficult to envision a brand-new federal 
program, with no existing organizational infrastructure, standing 
without the "flying buttress" of significant new bureacratic 
support. Second, there will be substantial training costs 
associated with each placement in a community agency. 
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It is 
inconceivable that young people can simply begin work in any 
community service without substantial job-specific training. Using 
existing state and local programs as a benchmark, training costs 
may reach $18,000 per hire (Economist, March 6, 1993). With simple 
arithmetic, the government's own estimates for 1997 amount to 
$34, 000 per participant. But, it is a third cost accruing to 
national service which provides the focus of the paper. 
Military Downsizing: an opportunity Cost of National Service 
Deficits averaging 3% to 5% of GDP have essentially guaranteed 
that a new program of discernible size will be funded through 
reductions in existing programs, given the political hazard of 
raising taxes. While the demise of the USSR and the end of the 
cold war has allowed defense cuts, it is argued that the reductions 
in defense expenditures (and military readiness) will be larger in 
the presence, rather than the absense, of national service. More 
importantly, it is argued that military service accomplishes the 
same goals that national service sets out to achieve, more 
effectively, more cost efficiently, and more equitably. 
The Joint Product Nature of Military Training 
First, it is worthwhile to distinguish between the aspects of 
human and social capital development which accompany military 
training. In enhancing the recruit's physical and mental skills, 
military service directly rewards the acquirer by shaping a more 
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productive labor resource. Succinctly, military experience 
enhances the value of a trainee as a capital (human) asset. The 
return on the individual's self-investment is seen in a higher 
rental price for labor services and a higher life cycle income. 
Social capital Generation 
Social capital generation refers to attributes nurished by the 
military experience which result in social benefits of equal 
magnitude for all citizens, veterans and non-veterans. These 
service-induced characteristics include a greater sense of personal 
and community responsibility, adaptability, self-discipline, and a 
greater exposure to and tolerance of differing viewpoints. The 
paper proposes that the quality of social capital produced through 
the military experience is unique and superior to that generated in 
other venues: e. g. , national service. Admittedly, measuring the 
value of social capital produced as a by-product of any endeavor is 
a difficult task. Yet, it does not require an undue stretch of the 
imagination to project that the social capital attributable to 
military service (self and group responsibilty, discipline) would 
be superior to that produced in the campus-like atmosphere of a 
national service program. It is perceived that human and social 
capital are a joint product of military training (Sondey, 1994). 
Technology and Transferability 
One measure of the applicability and value of military 
training in the civilian sector is the technological content of 
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military jobs. The technological content of the military job has 
increased significantly over time. For example, in 1945, white 
collar labor constituted 28% of the military labor force; whereas 
today, nearly 50% of armed forces military specialties (personnel 
assignment codes) are considered white collar (Binkin, 1986). Not 
only is military training more technologically intensive and less 
apt to be military-specific in nature, but the "grunt" aspects of 
military training (mess hall duty, grounds maintenance, janitorial) 
are increasingly out-sourced to civilian firms. 
A counterpart of the technological infusion into military jobs 
has been the improved transferability of military training to the 
civilian sector. Magnum and Ball (1989) found a skill 
transferability rate of 45%-50% for military inculcated skills, a 
higher rate than previously estimated. The enhanced 
transferability is likely to be a function of the increasing 
overlap between job characteristics in the military and civilian 
sectors. It is also likely to result from the greater degree of 
individual choice in enlistment and career paths (Sondey, 1994). 
Magnum and Ball also noted that the transferability rate from 
military training was equal to the rate from civilian (non­
employer) training. 
Veteran's Premium: Its Existence 
Evidence of the unique human capital productivity of the 
milit�ry services is provided through a number of longitudinal 
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studies which studied veterans' earnings in civilian life. With 
respect to World War II and Korean veterans, the body of evidence 
points to a positive and significant pay premium relative to the 
non-veteran cohort (Little and Fredland, 1979; Martindale and 
Poston, 1979). Conversely, the premium for Vietnam veterans may be 
negative. 'However, it is suggested that the absense of a premium 
for Vietnam veterans may be attributable to an adverse civilian 
labor market - supersaturated by an influx of baby-boomers and 
female entrants (DeTray, 1982; Little and Fredland, 1979). Or, it 
may be that the premium takes considerable time ( longer than 
covered by the studies) to reveal itself. In any case, the author 
agrees with Schwartz (1986), who regard the Vietnam era as an 
outlier, in terms of its effect on post-service earnings. 
The "outlier" hypothesis . is implicitly supported by the 
findings of Magnum and Ball (1989) who studied the civilian 
earnings of veterans in the post-draft (post-Vietnam) period. They 
found that an earnings premium for veterans of the all volunteer 
military did exist, and evidenced itself within two years of 
entrance into civilian employment. 
source of the Veteran's Premium 
What is the source of the veteran's wage differential? then, 
DeTray (l982)·and Little and Fredland (1979) attribute the.premium· 
to two factors: ( 1) differences in investment in education, by 
veterans and .non-veterans; and, (2) the perception, by employers, 
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of veteran status as a credential. 
Veterans of World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and of the all 
volunteer era have had access to educational rights of differing 
dimensions. By and large, veterans have exercised these rights to 
invest in education and training, thereby developing more 
marketable skills than the non-veteran counterpart. Concurrently, 
employers seeking to fill vacancies view veteran status as they 
might weigh added civilian training, a credential which: (a) is an 
effective screening device in winnowing the queue of job seekers; 
and, (b) a characteristic which enhances the value of labor 
services, necessitating a higher rental price. In this perception, 
veteran status provides a certification to the hiring firm that the 
applicant is trainable and capable of a certain level of 
responsibility and initiative. In short, an honorable discharge 
certifies that the veteran has been pre-screened and found capable 
by the military (Little a'nd Fredland, 1979). 
So far, the paper has sought to convince the reader of the 
existence and value of human and social capital created by the 
military experience. Next, we will consider the question of those 
who will become worse-off as the result of military down-sizing -
blacks and other minorities. 
The Military, African-Americans, and Buman capital Acquisition 
Since the advent of the all volunteer service in 1973, blacks 
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have volunteered in disproportionate numbers. Today, blacks make 
up more than 20% of the combined military services and 
approximately 30% of the Army. While the percentage of young, 
black youth enlisting has declined slightly in recent years, the 
overall black composition of the services has remained almost 
constant. This equilibrium is attributable to the fact that blacks 
are selecting to remain in the service for longer periods than 
whites. 
African-Americans now constitute a higher percentage of the 
top three enlisted grades than in previous decades {Binkin, 1993). 
Economists would argue that blacks are making calculated economic 
decisions in choosing to enlist and remain in the military. The 
decision to enlist is buttressed by the potential for training and 
human capital acquisition and is made in full light of 
opportunity costs in the civilian sector. Critics of the higher 
black composition of the military would condense the economist's 
perspective to a failure of government and the private sector to 
provide ample non-service training opportunities and · jobs for 
blacks. Nonetheless, African-Americans are acting in rational self 
interest by choosing to serve in the armed forces. 
The "Bridging" Effect of Military service 
Military service has been characterized as a ladder of 
socioeconomic mobility and a bridge which allows young minorities 
access to the economic mainstream. In examining the earnings of 
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World War II, Korea, and Vietnam veterans relative to their non-
veteran cohort, Martindale and Poston (1979) find a particularly 
strong, positive relationship between civilian earnings and 
military service for African and Mexican-Americans. 
Little and Fredland (1979), studied disaggregated data from 
the National Longitudinal survey on the earnings of men aged 45 to 
66, and concluded that military service has a significant and 
positive effect on civilian earnings many years after service. 
They compared the positive effects of service on the civilian 
earnings of blacks and whites. White veterans earned incomes 5% to 
10% higher than their non-veteran counterpart, while Hispanic and 
African-American veterans earned 13% - 15% more than their non-
veteran cohort. For white veterans, this service-connected 
increment to income was equal to the return of another year of 
formal education or four to seven added years of job tenure. For 
African-Americans, the service-caused increment is equivalent to 
two to three years additional formal schooling or seven added years 
of job tenure. 
It is no surprise that a strong, direct relationship exists 
between years of formal education completed and the availability of 
rights to subsidized education under the historical menu of GI 
Bills. Little and Fredland (1979) ·found that white veterans 
averaged one more year of post-military training than their 
. .  
civilian cohort. However, minority veterans averaged two and a 
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half additional years of formal education when compared to their 
non-veteran counterpart. 
The weight of the literature suggests that while both blacks 
and whites benefit from military service, blacks benefit more than 
whites. It follows that blacks will suffer greater economic 
hardships than whites from ongoing military force reductions. 
A New Military Enlistment Option 
Despite its pro forma recognition of the need to empower and 
create a civic leadership base among "residents of low-income 
communities, " the national service program is focused on the 
college-oriented segment of the youthful cohort. Certainly, the 
"forgiveness" aspect for educational loans will appeal to upwardly 
mobile youth, both white and of color. However, national service 
will bypass the majority of non-college directed youth. It is this 
group of "underachievers" that stands to benefit most from the 
proposed military program. 
The new enlistment option would require a twelve month period 
of active service, followed by optional duty in the reserves 
at the discretion of recruit and military service. A program for 
accession into the career ranks would allow the best of the new 
recruits the option of a military career and open a new pipeline of 
skilled recruits to the career military. Training would consist of 
four months of basic military training and eight months of training 
in a military operating specialty skill. 
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At the completion of 
enlistment, each recruit would be allowed a $5, 000 stipend for 
college or vocational civilian training. Additionally, student 
loans in the amount of $10, 000 (ceiling adjustable) would allow the 
recruit to complete an extended period of civilian 
education/training. 
Funding the New Enlistment Option 
It is further proposed that the new military option be funded 
by reducing the scope of the national service program. At present, 
national service is budgeted at $3. 4 billion ( 100, 000 participants) 
for fiscal year 1997. The paper proposes that national service be 
restricted to 50, 000 participants and that the approximately $1.7 
billion in savings be used to (nearly completely) fund 100, 000 
recruits under the new, 12 month enlistment option (see table 1). 
After the new option's advantages have been evidenced, the program 
can be expanded to 200, 000 in a facile manner. 
comparative Advantage of the New Military Service Option 
The new enlistment option could be easily appended, to the 
existing military infrastructure. Training 100, ooo additional 
youth (or even 200, 000) would not put undue stress on existing 
military facilities. Certainly, an increase in supervisory 
capacity and some facility modification would be needed. However, 
the military chain of command, organizational structure, and system 
of education�! and training procedures is in place and fully 
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operational. 
Alternately, national service will .require a new 
organizational structure and level of bureacracy. Furthermore, 
exactly what participants will do in national service remains a 
subject of conjecture. In short, the military/national service 
tradeoff replaces an established product with a recognized capacity 
for human capital development with an unknown product of an 
unproven potential. 
Compared to national service, the new military option would be 
relatively cost efficient (see Table 1). Even with a 33% 
supplemental allocation for supervisory and facility enhancement, 
the cost of training 100, 000 military recruits is less than 
national service. 
Such an option woula benefit the greater society in three 
ways. First, it would continue to extend the potential for 
personal development, discipline, and training to less advantaged 
youth. As the military down-sizes, it will become more demanding 
in terms of educational attainment and qualification test scores. 
Therefore, the burden of force reduction will be borne by 
minorities in particular and the least skilled in general. Second, 
on a tax dollar for tax dollar basis, monies spent on military 
training will yield a greater net return on social investment than 
will national service. Finally, as the Reserves have become an 
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integral part of the active military mission, the program will act 
to augment those forces (Binkin and Kaufman, 1989; Sondey, 1994) . 
summary 
Implicit in the allocation for a national service program are 
tradeoffs in terms of reduced expenditures for ongoing programs, 
including the military services . Military force reductions will 
most adversely effect minorities by removing the ladder of social 
mobility. The new enlistment option would modestly increase 
military force size while providing opportunities for the 
disenfranchized not addressed in national service. Reducing the 
maximum projected strength (1997) of national service to 50,000 
from 100, 000 would fully fund the new enlistment program while 
displacing no one . 
TABLE 1 
Cost Projections for New Enlistment Option 
under Two Force Increment Regimes 
12 Month Enlistment 
force increment cost 
100, 000 personnel $786 x 12 x 
(overhead @ 
education @ 
x 100, 000 
200, 000 personnel 
100, 000 = 
33%) = 
$5000 
= 
Total = 
Total = 
$943 mm 
311 mm 
500 mm 
$1, 754 mm 
$3, 508 mm 
a. Military basic pay is calculated using 1990 pay tables. 
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b. The average monthly pay of a recruit ($786) is derived thusly. 
It is assumed that during a fiscal year, the force increment will 
be evenly divided between the enlisted ranks of E-1, E-2, and E-3. 
The 1990 monthly pay scales for E-1 through E-3 are $684, $803, and 
$871, respectively. Therefore, $786 is the average monthly pay. 
Admittedly, this is a crude but necessary estimate of the average 
monthly wage once the system is fully operational. 
c. It is assumed that recruits will not be promoted beyond E-3 
during the 12 month enlistment. 
d. Only base pay is included in the calculations. However, if 
benefits such as quarters, food allowances, and medical are 
included in the matrix at 50% of base pay, cost benefit analysis 
will still weigh in favor of military service (national service 
estimate for 1997; 100, 000 participants and a cost of $3. 4 
billion). 
Source: derived from Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
1992. published by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, DC, 
1992, p. 345. 
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